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Appendix A Details Regarding the Retailers Gatekeep-
ing Process
One may note that in reality the retailer could adopt a di¤erent gatekeeping process by
setting an acceptance threshold to determine whether or not all products should be accepted
or rejected. That is, if the percentage of identied defects is greater than or equal to the
threshold, then the retailer rejects all products (sold by the manufacturer to the retailer);
otherwise, the retailer accepts the products. We do not consider the retailers gatekeeping
process with a threshold because of the following facts: By consulting with a number of
quality practitioners in the retail industry, we identify that the retailer may determine such an
acceptance threshold if she performs her quality inspection at the manufacturers site before
the shipment of the products. If the retailers sampling test indicates that the percentage
of defects exceeds the retailers threshold, then the manufacturer is required to inspect all
products, identify all defects, and replace them with good products. This means that the
gatekeeping process with an acceptance threshold takes place at the manufacturers site rather
than at the retailers, which di¤ers from our study in which the gatekeeping process occurs at
the retailers site, as observed in the practices of Asda, Tesco, and Wal-Mart. However, the
gatekeeping process with an acceptance threshold could be viewed as if the retailer acts as a
gatekeeper at her own store.Observing that the shipment may be delayed due to quality
problems, the retailer usually prepares a safety lead time for ordering products with the
manufacturer, in order to guarantee her service level.
Moreover, if a retailer inspects incoming products at her own store which is common in
the retail industry, then the retailer is unlikely to implement a gatekeeping process involving
an acceptance threshold but instead uses the process that is considered in our paper, because,
otherwise, she may experience a long shipping time, a high shipping cost for the round
tripof the products, and a large stockout probability. Actually, extant relevant publications
(including, e.g., Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 2005? and Hwang, Radhakrishnan, and
Su 2006?) investigated only the quality inspection process similar to that in our paper.
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Appendix B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Partially di¤erentiating R(p; I) in (2) once and twice w.r.t. p, we have
@R(p; I)
@p
= af1  b1[p  w   I + 2r(1  y(I))]g exp( b1p  b2y(I)r),
@2R(p; I)
@p2
=  ab1f2  b1[p  w   I + 2r(1  y(I))]g exp( b1p  b2y(I)r),
which is negative at the point that @R(p; I)=@p = 0. Thus, solving the rst order condition
yields that given w, I, and r, the optimal retail price can be uniquely found as
p(w; r; I) =
1 + b1[w + I   2r(1  y(I))]
b1
.
Substituting p(w; r; I) into R(p; I) in (2) gives
R(p
(w; r; I); I) =
a
b1
exp( 1  b1[w + I   2r(1  y(I))]  b2y(I)r).
Partially di¤erentiating R(p(w; r; I); I) once and twice w.r.t. I, we have
@R(p
(w; r; I); I)
@I
=   a
b1
exp( 1  b1[w + I   2r(1  y(I))]  b2y(I)r)
 [b1( + 2ry0(I)) + b2y0(I)r],
@2R(p
(w; r; I); I)
@I2
=
a
b1
exp( 1  b1[w + I   2r(1  y(I))]  b2y(I)r)
 f[b1( + 2ry0(I)) + b2y0(I)r]2   (b12 + b2)ry00(I)g.
At the point that @R(p(w; r; I); I)=@I = 0, b1(+2ry0(I))+b2y0(I)r = 0 and @2R(p(w; r; I); I)=@I2 <
0. Therefore, we prove this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. To nd the GNB-characterized wholesale price, we need to solve the
maximization problem:
maxw;r 
(w; r) = (M(w; r))
(R(w; r))
1 .
Using (5) and (6), we re-write 
(w; r) as,

(w; r) =
a(w; r)
b1 1
,
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where
(w; r)  fw   c  [1y(I(r))r + 2(1  y(I(r)))r]  C(r)g
 exp( f1 + b1[w + I(r)  2r(1  y(I(r))]g   b2y(I(r))r).
Taking the logarithm of (w; r) we obtain ln((w; r)) = 1 + 2, where
1  lnfw   c  [1y(I(r))r + 2(1  y(I(r)))r]  C(r)g,
2   f1 + b1[w + I(r)  2r(1  y(I(r))]g   b2y(I(r))r.
The rst- and second-order derivatives of 1 w.r.t. w are computed as,
@1
@w
=
1
w   c  [1y(I(r))r + 2(1  y(I(r)))r]  C(r) ,
@21
@w2
=   1
[w   c  [1y(I(r))r + 2(1  y(I(r)))r]  C(r)]2 < 0.
The rstand second-order derivatives of 2 w.r.t. w are
@2
@w
=  b1 and @
22
@w2
= 0.
Therefore, given r, ln((w; r)) is a strictly concave function of w, which means that (w; r)
and 
(w; r) are log-concave functions of w. There must exist a unique GNB solution w(r),
which satises the rst order condition @(ln((w; r)))=@w = 0. That is,
@(ln((w)))
@w
=

w   c  [1y(I(r))r + 2(1  y(I(r)))r]  C(r)   b1 = 0.
We can then nd the negotiated wholesale price w(r) as in (7).
Proof of Lemma 3. The rst-order partial derivative of (r) with respect to r is computed
as follows:
@(r)
@r
=  (r)

b1


@I(r)
@r
+ C 0(r) + 1y0(I(r))r
@I(r)
@r
+ 1y(I
(r))

+b2y
0(I(r))r
@I(r)
@r
+ b2y(I
(r))

.
Lemma 1 indicates that (b12 + b2)y0(I(r))r =  b1. The rst-order derivative @(r)=@r can
be simplied as
@(r)
@r
=  (r)

(1   2)b1y0(I(r))r@I
(r)
@r
+ b1C
0(r) + (b11 + b2)y(I(r))

.
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We di¤erentiate both sides of (b12 + b2)y0(I(r))r =  b1 w.r.t. r, and nd
@I(r)
@r
=   y
0(I(r))
y00(I(r))r
=
1 + I(r)
2r
.
We re-write @(r)=@r as
@(r)
@r
=  (r)

1
2
b1(1 + 2)y(I
(r)) + b1C 0(r) + b2y(I(r))

.
Then, we compute the second-order derivative of (r) with respect to r and nd
@2(r)
@r2
= (r)

1
2
b1(1 + 2)y(I
(r)) + b1C 0(r) + b2y(I(r))
2
  (r)

1
2
b1(1 + 2)y
0(I(r))
@I(r)
@r
+ b1C
00(r) + b2y0(I(r))
@I(r)
@r

= (r)

1
2
b1(1 + 2)y(I
(r)) + b1C 0(r) + b2y(I(r))
2
  (r)

  1
4r
b1(1 + 2)y(I
(r)) + b1C 00(r)  1
2r
b2y(I
(r))

.
At the point satisfying the rst-order condition that @(r)=@r = 0, we have the following
equation:
b1(1 + 2)y(I
(r)) + 2b1C 0(r) + 2b2y(I(r)) = 0.
Using this equation, we have
@2(r)
@r2
=  (r)b1
r

1
2
C 0(r) + rC 00(r)

<  (r)b1
r
C(r),
where C(r)  (C 0(r)+rC 00(r)). If C(r) > 0, then @2(r)=@r2 < 0 and (r) is strictly concave
in r. This lemma is thus proved.
Proof of Proposition 1. Comparing the two equations in (10), we reach the equation in (11),
where on the left-hand side, I=C(r) is the ratio of the retailers per product gatekeeping cost
to the manufacturers per product quality-control cost. The right-hand side is the ratio of eI
to er. The term eI is the elasticity of the percentage of unidentied defects with respect to the
retailers gatekeeping intensity. Since the denominator in the term er (i.e., C 0(r)=(C(r)=r))
is the elasticity of the manufacturers unit quality-control cost with respect to his average
defective rate, the term er can be explained as the elasticity of the average defective rate with
respect to the manufacturers unit quality-control cost. Simply put, eI < 0 and er < 0 denote
the retailers and the manufacturers e¤ectiveness in quality assurance, respectively. A smaller
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negative value of eI (er) or a larger absolute value of eI (er) indicates the retailers (the
manufacturers) higher e¤ectiveness. It thus follows from the above that eI=er is the ratio
between the retailers and the manufacturers e¤ort elasticities of quality-control e¤ectiveness.
Proof of Corollary 1. From the two rmsprot functions, we can compute the ratio
R(w
; r)
M(w; r)
=
1

,
which results in this corollary.
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating both sides of the equation in (9) w.r.t. 1 yields
b1y(I
(r)) + [b1(1 + 2) + 2b2]y0(I(r))
@I(r)
@r
@r
@1
=  2b1C 00(r)@r

@1
. (17)
From the proof of Lemma 3, we have
@I(r)
@r
=
1 + I(r)
2r
.
Noting that
y0(I(r)) =  (1 + I(r)) 2,
and using (9), we re-write (17) as
y(I(r)) =   1
r
( C(r) + rC 00(r))
@r
@1
,
which implies that @r=@1 < 0. Moreover, @I(r)=@1 = (@I(r)=@r)jr=r  (@r=@1) < 0,
which follows as @I(r)=@r > 0.
In addition, for the average defective rate for consumers, we have
@ (ry(I(r)))
@1
=
@r
@1
y(I(r)) + ry0(I(r))
@I(r)
@r
@r
@1
=
y(I(r))
2
@r
@1
< 0.
Similar to the above, we nd that @r=@2 < 0, @I(r)=@2 < 0, and @ (ry(I(r))) =@2 <
0. This proposition is thus proved.
Proof of Proposition 3. We replace r in w(r) in (7) with r that is obtained by solving
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the equation in (9), and di¤erentiate w(r) once w.r.t. 1 as
@w(r)
@1
= C 0(r)
@r
@1
+ y(I)r + 1y0(I)r
@I
@1
+ 1y(I
)
@r
@1
  2y0(I)r@I

@1
+ 2(1  y(I))@r

@1
.
From the proof of Proposition 2, we have
y(I(r)) =   1
r
( C(r) + rC 00(r))
@r
@1
,
and
y0(I)r
@I
@1
= y0(I)r
@I
@r

r=r
@r
@1
=  y(I
)
2
@r
@1
. (18)
We re-write @w(r)=@1 as
@w(r)
@1
=

2   2rC 00(r) + 1
2
(1   2)y(I)

@r
@1
,
where @r=@1 < 0. It thus follows that @w(r)=@1 > 0 if and only if
1
2
y(I)1 +

1  1
2
y(I)

2 < 2r
C 00(r).
Using (9), we have
 

(1 + 2) +
2b2
b1

y(I) = 2C 0(r), (19)
and obtain the condition specied in this proposition. The proposition is thus proved.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using (3) and the proof of Proposition 3, we compute the rst-order
derivative of p(w; r) w.r.t. 1 as
@p(w; r)
@1
=
@w(r)
@1
+ 
@I
@1
  2@r

@1
(1  y(I)) + 2ry0(I)@I

@1
=

 2rC 00(r) + 1
2
y(I)

@r
@1
+ 
@I
@r
@r
@1
=

 2rC 00(r) + 1
2
y(I)

@r
@1
+ 
1 + I
2r
@r
@1
.
As Lemma 1 indicates, (b12 + b2)y0(I)r =  b1. We thus have
 =  

2 +
b2
b1

y0(I)r =

2 +
b2
b1

r(1 + I) 2, (20)
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and we can re-write @p(w; r)=@1 as
@p(w; r)
@1
=

 2rC 00(r) + 1
2
y(I)

@r
@1
+

2
2
+
b2
2b1

y(I)
@r
@1
.
Recalling from (9) that [b1(1 + 2) + 2b2]y(I) =  2b1C 0(r), we have 1y(I) =  2C 0(r) 
2y(I
)  2b2y(I)=b1 and re-write @p(w; r)=@1 as
@p(w; r)
@1
=  

rC 00(r) + C(r) +

2
2
+
b2
b1

y(I)

@r
@1
+

2
2
+
b2
2b1

y(I)
@r
@1
=  

rC 00(r) + C(r) +
b2
2b1
y(I)

@r
@1
> 0,
which means that the retail price is increasing in the unit penalty cost for each unidentied
defect.
Next, we examine the impact of 1 on the demand D(p(w; r); r; I). Di¤erentiating
D(p(w; r); r; I) w.r.t. 1 and using (18), we obtain
@D(p(w; r); r; I)
@1
=  a

b1
@p(w; r)
@1
+
b2y(I
)
2
@r
@1

exp( b1p(w; r)  b2y(I)r)
= ab1

rC 00(r) + C(r)
 @r
@1
exp( b1p(w; r)  b2y(I)r)
< 0.
The proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 5. We compute the rst-order derivative of w(r) w.r.t. 2 as
@w(r)
@2
= C 0(r)
@r
@2
+ 1y
0(I)r
@I
@2
+ 1y(I
)
@r
@2
+ (1  y(I(r)))r   2y0(I)r@I

@2
+ 2(1  y(I))@r

@2
.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, we can simplify @w(r)=@2 as
@w(r)
@2
= r +

2 + 2 C(r
) +
1
2
y(I)(1   2)

@r
@2
.
Using (19), we re-write @w(r)=@2 as
@w(r)
@2
= r +

2(1  y(I)) + C(r) + rC 00(r)  b2
b1
y(I)

@r
@2
,
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which must be positive if 2 <  where  is dened as in (12).
We also calculate the rst-order derivative of p(w; r) w.r.t. 2 as
@p(w; r)
@2
=
@w(r)
@2
+ 
@I
@2
  r(1  y(I))  2(1  y(I))@r

@2
+ 2r
y0(I)
@I
@2
=

C(r) + rC 00(r)  b2
b1
y(I)

@r
@2
+ ry(I) + [ + 2ry0(I)]
@I
@2
=

C(r) + rC 00(r)  b2
b1
y(I)

@r
@2
+ ry(I) +
b2
2b1
y(I)
@r
@2
,
where the last equality follows from (20).
Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, we can show that
y(I(r)) =   1
r
( C(r) + rC 00(r))
@r
@2
.
It follows that
@p(w; r)
@2
=   b2
2b1
y(I)
@r
@2
> 0,
and
@D(p(w; r); r; I)
@2
=  a

b1
@p(w; r)
@2
+
b2y(I
)
2
@r
@2

exp( b1p(w; r)  b2y(I)r)
= 0.
Therefore, we prove this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6. Using (5), (6), and (7), we write R(w; r) and M(w; r) as
R(w
; r) =
a
b1

(r; I) and M(w; r) =
a
b1

(r; I), (21)
where

(r; I)  exp( [1 +  + b1(I + c+ C(r) + 1y(I)r)]  b2y(I)r). (22)
Thus, we only need to analyze the impact of i (i = 1; 2) on 
(r; I) in (22). Di¤erentiating
8
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(r; I) once w.r.t. 1, we have
@
(r; I)
@1
= 
(r; I)

 b1


@I
@1
+ C 0(r)
@r
@1
+ y(I)r + 1y0(I)r
@I
@1
+ 1y(I
)
@r
@1

 b2

y0(I)r
@I
@1
+ y(I)
@r
@1

=  
(r; I)

b1y(I
)r + (b1 + b11y0(I)r + b2y0(I)r)
@I
@1
+ (b1C
0(r) + b11y(I) + b2y(I))
@r
@1

.
Using (18) and (20), we can re-write the above as
@
(r; I)
@1
=  
(r; I)

b1y(I
)r + b1 (1   2) y0(I)r@I

@1
+ (b1C
0(r) + b11y(I) + b2y(I))
@r
@1

=  
(r; I)

b1y(I
)r   b1 (1   2) y(I
)
2
@r
@1
+ (b1C
0(r) + b11y(I) + b2y(I))
@r
@1

=  b1
(r; I)

y(I)r +

C 0(r) +

(1 + 2) +
2b2
b1

y(I)
2

@r
@1

.
It follows from (19) that
@
(r; I)
@1
=  b1
(r; I)y(I)r < 0.
Similarly, we can show that
@
(r; I)
@2
= 0.
The proposition thus follows.
Proof of Proposition 7. We di¤erentiate w(r) once w.r.t. , and nd @w(r)=@ =
1=b1 > 0. The rst-order derivative of p(w; r) w.r.t.  is computed as @p(w; r)=@ =
1=b1. We also nd
@D(p(w; r); r; I)
@
=  a exp( b1p(w; r)  b2y(I)r) < 0.
We thus obtain this proposition.
Proof of Proposition 8. According to (21) and (22), we compute
@R(w
; r)
@
=
a
b1
@
(r; I)
@
=   a
b1

(r; I) < 0,
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and
@M(w
; r)
@
=
(1  )a
b1

(r; I) > 0.
Moreover,
@(R(w
; r) + M(w; r))
@
=  a
b1

(r; I) < 0.
In addition,
j@R(w; r)=@j
@M(w; r)=@
=
1
1   > 1.
We thus prove this proposition.
Proof of Lemma 4. The rst- and second-order derivatives of ^R(p) w.r.t. p are
@^R(p)
@p
= a exp( b1p  b2r)[1  b1(p  w)],
@2^R(p)
@p2
=  b1a exp( b1p  b2r)[2  b1(p  w)],
which is negative at the point that @^R(p)=@p = 0. The optimal retail price is thus found as
shown in this lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5. We use p^(w; r) in Lemma 4 to specify ^M(w; r) and ^R(p^(w; r)) as
^M(w; r) = a exp( (1 + b1w + b2r))(w   c  1r   C(r));
^R(p^
(w; r)) = a exp( (1 + b1w + b2r))=b1.
The GNB solutions w^ and r^ can be found by solving
max
w;r
(^M(w; r))
  (^R(p^(w; r))1  = a
b1 1
^(w; r),
where
^(w; r)  exp( (1 + b1w + b2r))(w   c  1r   C(r)).
Taking the logarithm of both sides of ^(w; r) yields,
L^(w; r)  ln ^(w; r) = ^1 + ^2,
where
^1   (1 + b1w + b2r) and ^2  ln(w   c  1r   C(r)).
Next, we nd w^ and r^ by using the following steps. First, given a value of r, we compute
the GNB solution w^(r). Then, we substitute w^(r) into ^M(w; r) and ^R(p^(w; r)) , and
10
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calculate the GNB solution r^, which can be used to nd w^ = w^(r). In the rst step, we
compute the rstand second-order derivatives of ^1 w.r.t. w as
@^1
@w
=  b1 and @
2^1
@w2
= 0.
The rst- and second-order derivatives of ^2 w.r.t. w are
@^2
@w
=
1
w   c  1r   C(r) and
@2^2
@w2
=   1
(w   c  1r   C(r))2 < 0.
Therefore, (^M(w; r))  (^R(p^(w; r))1  is a log-concave function of w. The GNB solution
w^(r) satises the rst-order condition @L^(w; r)=@w = 0, where
@L^(w; r)
@w
=

w   c  1r   C(r)   b1.
The negotiated wholesale price w^(r) is thus found as
w^(r) =

b1
+ c+ 1r + C(r).
In the second step, to compute the GNB-characterized average defective rate r^, we need to
solve the maximization problem: maxr^ ^(r)  (^M(w^(r); r))  (^R(p^(w^(r); r))1 , where
^M(w^
(r); r) =
a
b1
exp( [1 +  + b1(c+ 1r + C(r)) + b2r]),
^R(p^
(w^(r); r)) =
a
b1
exp( [1 +  + b1(c+ 1r + C(r)) + b2r]).
The rst- and second-order derivatives of ^(r) w.r.t. r are
@^(r)
@r
=  a

b1
[b1(1 + C
0(r)) + b2] exp( [1 +  + b1(c+ 1r + C(r)) + b2r]),
@2^(r)
@r2
=  a

b1
b1C
00(r) exp( [1 +  + b1(c+ 1r + C(r)) + b2r])
+
a
b1
[b1(1 + C
0(r)) + b2]2 exp( [1 +  + b1(c+ 1r + C(r)) + b2r]).
Setting @^(r)=@r to zero and solving it for r, we nd that the optimal solution must satisfy the
equation b1(1+C 0(r))+b2 = 0. At the point that satises the equation b1(1+C 0(r))+b2 = 0,
@2^(r)
@r2
=  a

b1
b1C
00(r) exp( [1 +  + b1(c+ 1r + C(r)) + b2r]) < 0,
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and ^(r) is strictly concave. This lemma is then proved.
Proof of Proposition 9. The demand function D^(p^(r^); r^) = a exp( 1   b1(c+ 1r^+
C(r^))  b2r^) implies that the retailers stronger relative bargaining power can help increase
the demand. Such a result also holds when the retailer takes on the gatekeeping responsibility,
as shown in Proposition 7.
Next, we prove the impact of  on the two rmsprots. The rst-order derivatives of
^M(w^
(r^); r^) and ^R(p^(w^(r^); r^)) w.r.t.  are
@^M(w^
(r^); r^)
@
=
a(1  )
b1
exp( 1     b1(c+ 1r^ + C(r^))  b2r^) > 0,
and
@^R(p^
(w^(r^); r^))
@
=   a
b1
exp( 1     b1(c+ 1r^ + C(r^))  b2r^) < 0.
It then follows that
@(^M(w^
(r^); r^) + ^R(p^(w^(r^); r^)))
@
=  a
b1
exp( 1     b1(c+ 1r^+C(r^))  b2r^) < 0.
Comparing the above result with Proposition 8, we prove this proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1. Using (9) and Lemma 5, we nd
2b1(C
0(r)  C 0(r^)) = (b11 + 2b2)(1  y(I)) + b1(1   2y(I))  0,
when 2  !1 with !1 dened as in (14). This implies that if 2  !1, then r  r^; otherwise,
r > r^.
Next, we investigate the change in the average defective rate for consumers that results
from the quality gatekeeping at the retail level. When the retailer implements her quality
gatekeeping strategy, the average defective rate for consumers is y(I)r. When the retailer
does not inspect the quality, the average defective rate for consumers is the same as the
manufacturers average defective rate r^. According to (9) and Lemma 5, we obtain
(b11 + 2b2)(y(I
)r   r^) =  2b1(C 0(r)r   C 0(r^)r^)  b1(2y(I)r   1r^)  0,
when 2  !2 with !2 dened as in (15). That is, if 2  !2, then y(I)r  r^; otherwise,
y(I)r > r^.
We nd from (15) that
!2 =
1r^
   2(C 0(r)r   C 0(r^)r^)
y(I)r
=
1r^

y(I)r
  2(C
0(r)r   C 0(r^)r^)
y(I)r
.
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When 2 < !1, because r > r^ and C 0(r)r > C 0(r^)r^, we have
!2 <
1r^

y(I)r
<
1
y(I)
< !1.
The theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. We calculate
w   w^ = M  C(r) + 1y(I)r + 2(1  y(I))r   1r^   C(r^), (23)
which represents the increase in the manufacturers unit quality-related cost that results from
the retailers quality gatekeeping. Note that if M < 0, then  M is the manufacturers
quality cost saving generated by the retailers gatekeeping.
We then compute the di¤erence between the optimal retail prices p(w; r) and p^(r^) as
p(w; r)  p^(r^) = M + R, (24)
where R = I   2r(1  y(I)) denotes the retailers net unit gatekeeping cost, as dened
in Section 3.1. If R < 0, then  R is viewed as the retailers unit cost saving generated by
her gatekeeping activity. When there is a channel-wide cost saving (i.e., M + R < 0), the
retailer is willing to reduce her optimal retail price. As indicated by (23) and (24), the signs
of (w   w^) and (p(w; r)  p^(r^)) depend on M and R.
We compute
D(p(w; r); r; I)  D^(p^(r^); r^)
= a exp( b1p(r; I)  b2y(I)r)  a exp( b1p^(r^)  b2r^)
= a exp( 1     b1(c+ C(r) + 1y(I)r + I)  b2y(I)r)
  a exp( 1     b1(c+ 1r^ + C(r^))  b2r^). (25)
We nd that
[ 1     b1(c+ C(r) + 1y(I)r + I)  b2y(I)r]
  [ 1     b1(c+ 1r^ + C(r^))  b2r^]
=  b1(M + R)  b2(y(I)r   r^).
Moreover, we nd from (25) that if the inequality in (16) is satised, thenD(p(w; r); r; I) >
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D^(p^(r^); r^), and
@

D(p(w; r); r; I)  D^(p^(r^); r^)

@
=  

D(p(w; r); r; I)  D^(p^(r^); r^)

< 0,
which means that the di¤erence between D(p(w; r); r; I) and D^(p^(r^); r^) is decreasing
in .
Next, we examine the impact of  on the channel-wide prot. We compute
(R(w
; r) + M(w; r))  (^M(w^; r^) + ^R(w^; r^))
=
(1 + )
b1
[D(p(w; r); r; I)  D^(p^(r^); r^)],
which implies that the impact of  on the channel-wide prot is the same as that on the
demand.
Moreover, we compute
R(w
; r)  ^R(w^; r^)
=
1
b1
[D(p(w; r); r; I)  D^(p^(r^); r^)],
and
M(w
; r)  ^M(w^; r^)
=

b1
[D(p(w; r); r; I)  D^(p^(r^); r^)],
which means that both the manufacturers and the retailers prot changes are the same as
the change in demand. We can thus prove this theorem.
Appendix C Robustness of Major Implications for Dif-
ferent Demand Functions
We now examine whether our major managerial insights that are summarized in Section 5 still
hold if we consider di¤erent demand functions. We consider two commonly-used nonlinear
demand functions: the logistic demand function (see, e.g., Phillips 2005?) and the attraction
demand function (see, e.g., Benjaafar, Elahi, and Donohue 2007?). For details regarding the
two demand function forms, see a recent review by Huang, Leng, and Parlar (?).
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C.1 Robustness of Major Implications for the Logistic Demand
Function
We consider the following logistic demand function (see, e.g., Phillips 2005?):
D(p; r; I) =
a
1 + exp(a0 + b1p+ b2y(I)r)
, (26)
where a represents the market size and the parameters a0; b1; b2 > 0. Since it is intractable
to analyze the two-stage problem with the demand function in (26), we subsequently perform
numerical experiments with the parameter values as a = 1000, a0 = 0:03, b1 = 0:01, and
b2 = 0:03. In addition, the percentage of unidentied defects y(I) is a power function y(I) =
(1 + I) 1. We also assume that the retailers unit gatekeeping cost  = 3, the manufacturers
unit acquisition cost c = 40, the manufacturers relative bargaining power  = 0:4, the unit
penalty costs 1 = 1 and 2 = 1:2, and the manufacturers unit quality-control cost function
C(r) = 10=
p
1 + 5r.
We use the software of Maple 2015 to solve the two-stage problem, and obtain the nego-
tiated average defective rate and the retailers optimal gatekeeping intensity as r = 9:03%
and I = 67%, respectively; the negotiated wholesale price is w = $59:01, and the optimal
retail price is p = $95:66. The demand is 272; the retailers and the manufacturers prots
are $9; 406:39 and $2; 877:73, respectively; and the supply chain prot is $12; 284:12.
Without the retailers gatekeeping, the negotiated average defective rate is r^ = 9:24%,
which is greater than ry(I) = 5:41%. But, if we reduce the value of 2 from 1:2 to 0:5, then
ry(I) = 9:35% > r^. This means that our rst implication in Section 5 holds. In addition,
for the case of no gatekeeping, we obtain the negotiated wholesale price as w^ = $59:78 and
the optimal retail price as p^ = $91:32. We note that w^ > w = $59:01 and M =  0:01,
which implies that as a result of the gatekeeping activity at the retail level, the manufacturer
achieves the cost saving $0:01 and thus, the negotiated wholesale price is reduced from $59:78
to $59:01. We also nd that p^ < p = $95:66 and M + R = 0:09. It then follows that
the retailers gatekeeping activity makes the channel incur a higher quality-related cost and
thus the optimal retail price is increased. The above result is consistent with the second
implication given in Section 5.
When the retailer does not perform gatekeeping, the retailers prot is $8; 555:65, which is
smaller than that when the retailer has the gatekeeping activity. If we increase the value of b1
from 0.01 to 0.02, then the retailers gatekeeping reduces the retailers prot from $4; 338:66
to $3; 946:25. But, if the value of  is reduced from 0.4 to 0.2, then the retailers prot is
increased to $5; 305:71. This shows that the third implication listed in Section 5 holds.
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C.2 Robustness of Major Implications for the Attraction Demand
Function
We consider the following attraction demand function (see, e.g., Benjaafar, Elahi, and Donohue
2007?):
D(p; r; I) =
a(b1p+ b2y(I)r)
(b1p+ b2y(I)r)  a0 , (27)
where a; a0; b1; b2 > 0. It is also intractable to analyze the two-stage problem with the demand
function in (27). We thus have to conduct numerical experiments with the parameter values
in (27) as a = 500, a0 = 0:1, b1 = 0:01, and b2 = 0:03. Other parameter values and functions
are the same as those used in Appendix C.1.
We use the software of Maple 2015 to solve the two-stage problem, and obtain the nego-
tiated average defective rate and the retailers optimal gatekeeping intensity as r = 8:76%
and I = 56%, respectively; the negotiated wholesale price is w = $72:91; and the optimal
retail price is p = $101:33. The demand is 555; the retailers and the manufacturers prots
are $14; 848:67 and $13; 573:31, respectively; and the supply chain prot is $28; 421:98.
Without the retailers gatekeeping, the negotiated average defective rate is r^ = 9:23%,
which is greater than ry(I) = 5:62%. But, if we reduce the value of 2 from 1:2 to 0:5,
then ry(I) = 9:41% > r^. This means that our rst implication in Section 5 holds. In
addition, we obtain the negotiated wholesale price as w^ = $74:12 and the optimal retail price
as p^ = $99:34. We note that w^ > wand M =  0:02, which implies that as a result of the
gatekeeping activity at the retail level, the manufacturer achieves the cost saving $0:02 and
thus, the negotiated wholesale price is reduced. We also nd that p^ < p and M +R = 0:17.
It then follows that the retailers gatekeeping activity makes the channel incur a higher cost
and thus the optimal retail price is increased. The above result is consistent with the second
implication given in Section 5.
When the retailer does not perform gatekeeping, the retailers prot is $14; 017:10, which
is smaller than that when the retailer has the gatekeeping activity. If we increase the value of
b1 from 0.01 to 0.02, then the retailers gatekeeping reduces the retailers prot to $13; 212:53.
But, if the value of  is reduced from 0:4 to 0.2, then the retailers prot is increased to
$14; 848:67. This shows that the third implication listed in Section 5 holds.
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